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Bombs, Trials, and Rights: Norm Complexity and the Evolution of Liberal Intervention Practices 
Caroline Fehl* 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the contested relationship between two practices of intervention on behalf 
of human rights victims, “humanitarian” military interventions and judicial interventions through 
international criminal tribunals. While both practices have come to be viewed as complementary 
instruments in the liberal interventionist “toolbox," their historical evolution was marked by 
tensions and controversies. To understand both the source of these frictions and how they could 
be (partly) overcome, the article draws attention to historical and contemporary processes of 
norm hybridization, that is, to discursive and institutional shifts that have merged different, pre-
existing normative ideas into new, complex normative arrangements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is by now a conventional wisdom that the global rise of human rights norms in the course of 
the twentieth century has entailed numerous interventions in the internal affairs of states, 
overwhelmingly by Western liberal democracies, on behalf of the victims of human rights 
violations. Military humanitarian interventions are but one variant of this interventionism, which 
has also manifested itself in international criminal prosecutions of rights violations, aid 
conditionality, rights-based approaches to development, and democracy promotion.
1
 Liberal 
interventionism thus constitutes a bundle of different intervention norms and practices, which 
have historically co-evolved.
2
 And yet, this article seeks to demonstrate, relationships between 
these different norms and practices are complex and contested, giving rise to normative tensions 
and dynamics within the liberal interventionist paradigm that merit closer attention by scholars. 
The following analysis focuses on the relationship of two norm-based intervention 
 2 
practices: humanitarian military intervention,
3
 on the one hand, and the prosecution of atrocities 
in international criminal courts and tribunals, on the other. As scholars have noted, military and 
judicial interventions are both rooted in a liberal notion of universal human rights, and both have 
come to be viewed as complementary elements of the toolkit which the international community 
regularly employs in reacting to mass atrocities.
4
 
Recent conflicts and crises provide many examples of the close association of both forms 
of intervention. In the Libyan civil war in 2011, the UN Security Council first referred the 
situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in resolution 1970 and then authorized a 
military intervention in resolution 1971 only one month later. Equally in 2011, the ICC 
Prosecutor opened an ICC investigation into the post-election violence that had taken place in 
Côte d’Ivoire. In this case, the ICC investigation followed in the footsteps of a joint military 
intervention by French and UN troops. In 2013, the ICC followed a similar pattern in announcing 
an investigation of crimes committed in Mali, only five days after the start of a French 
intervention in the country. Even in the ongoing Syrian civil war, where the Council has 
authorized neither military measures to protect civilians nor an ICC referral, the debate about 
potential international reactions illustrates the extent to which judicial and military interventions 
have come to be perceived as a package. Russian representatives, in particular, rejected an ICC 
referral on the grounds that it would “lay the groundwork for eventual outside military 
intervention."
5
 While this rhetorical move may well have been disingenuous, it was rendered 
possible by previous crises, most prominently Libya, in which judicial and military interventions 
took place in close succession. 
In light of these recent events and debates, it is easy to overlook that the positive 
association of military and judicial interventions has historically been neither unambiguous nor 
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uncontested. In the early 2000s, when the ICC took up its work while governments and experts 
debated humanitarian intervention under the newly formed notion of a “responsibility to protect," 
many observers warned against possible negative interaction effects. Some argued that 
international tribunals could escalate tensions
6
 and complicate efforts by external intervening 
forces to engage in armed mediation to settle conflicts.
7
 Others argued that criminal prosecutions 
could deter humanitarian interventions 
8
 or serve as a “fig-leaf” for states seeking to avoid costly 
military measures.
9
 These earlier discussions contrast starkly with recent warnings that 
international criminal justice has become too closely linked to military action, potentially 
undermining its authority.
10
 
To shed light on these apparent contradictions in the parallel historical trajectories of 
judicial and military intervention practices, this article investigates two questions: First, why is it 
that despite their common roots in liberal human rights norms, the relationship between both 
forms of intervention has been beset by tensions and controversies? And second, how is it 
possible that both nevertheless became part of the liberal interventionist toolkit? 
To answer these questions, the following analysis traces processes of norm hybridization 
and resulting problems of norm complexity that have marked the parallel evolution of military 
and judicial intervention practices. Humanitarian military interventions and international 
criminal justice interventions are both products of the twentieth century rise of human rights 
norms, but each is anchored in a distinct mix of human rights norms with older norms of warfare. 
The article argues that these hybrid normative origins of both intervention practices gave rise to 
contradictions and tensions between them, but also enabled political efforts to forge new 
compromises. By tracing political actors’ evolving discursive justifications of military and 
criminal justice interventions, it shows how both forms of intervention were made into 
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complementary tools by pushing alternative interpretations of their relationship to the 
background—but not completely – so their association remains fragile and contested. 
In developing this argument, the article contributes to a literature on liberal 
interventionism which has studied both the common origins and the individual trajectories of 
different rights-related intervention practices, but has paid less attention to their changing and 
contested relationship. At the same time, it also contributes to research on the evolution of norms 
in international politics by highlighting how norm-based intervention practices have historically 
evolved through the hybridization of different normative ideas. While constructivist international 
relations (IR) theorists have recently drawn attention to the contestedness of norms and dynamics 
of norm change, they have neglected the internal complexity of norms as both a source and a 
result of this dynamism. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section two briefly reviews 
contemporary theoretical approaches to norm dynamics, identifying norm complexity and 
hybridization as critical gaps in the literature. Section three draws on existing research to 
highlight the hybrid normative origins of military and judicial intervention practices in the name 
of human rights. Section four analyses how these hybrid origins shaped the evolving relationship 
between military and judicial intervention practices. By scrutinizing how political actors justified 
both forms of intervention at different historical moments, it seeks to demonstrate that the 
internal normative complexity of both forms of intervention that resulted from hybridization 
created tensions between them and space for controversies about their relationship. It also shows 
how these tensions were reduced, albeit not completely resolved, through the construction of 
new discursive and institutional compromise arrangements. 
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II. THEORIZING NORM COMPLEXITY 
Recent research on norms in international politics has highlighted that even after their adoption, 
global norms remain malleable and open to different interpretations, giving rise to contestation 
and norm change.
11
 This article’s analysis of norm-based intervention practices shares this basic 
premise of norm dynamism, while highlighting one thus far neglected aspect of norm evolution: 
the hybridization of different global norms and the resulting internal complexity of norms.
12
 This 
lacuna in existing norms research can be described in terms of three blind spots. 
First, many norms researchers have focused on tracing and understanding contestation 
and change of individual norms, but have bracketed the question of how positive and negative 
relationships between global norms are forged, challenged, and changed. Where they discuss 
norm conflicts or positive associations between different norms, scholars mostly treat these norm 
relations as given, exogenous factors that explain why individual norms emerge or fail to 
emerge,
13
 why they become disputed,
14
 why certain interpretations prevail,
15
 or why some norms 
are more resilient than others to challenges.
16
 
Second, those scholars who do note the active making of norm relationships typically 
focus on a narrow set of actors and linkages. Drawing particularly on Richard Price’s pioneering 
work on grafting,
17
 several contributions show how “norm entrepreneurs” can advance emerging 
norms by discursively linking them to pre-existing (global or local) norms.
18
 While taking a 
more dynamic view on norm relationships, these studies remain limited by their focus on specific 
agents (norm entrepreneurs), phases (norm emergence) and types (positive association) of 
linkage. 
The third shortcoming is the lack of interest in the hybridization of different global norms 
–the merging of different normative ideas into a new, complex norm—as an outcome and source 
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of norm dynamism.
19
 This lack of interest appears surprising in light of recent contributions that 
highlight how global and local norms are fused in processes of “norm localization.”20 This article 
argues that hybridization of different global norms is both a frequent outcome and a key driver of 
norm evolution. This theoretical expectation is based not only on an extension of arguments 
about global-local hybridity to global-global norm relations, but also on recent proposals to 
enrich IR norms research with insights from French pragmatist sociology.
21
 According to these 
proposals, the pragmatist argument that social actors constantly manage an irreducible plurality 
of moral orders can be used to highlight the often overlooked complexity of international norms. 
Apparently singular norms, such as the whaling ban, can be understood as compromises between 
different broader evaluative principles, such as sustainability, cultural protection, and science—
compromises that remain temporary and fragile, and thus open to challenges by critical actors.
22
 
The following analysis builds on and adds to these recent arguments about norm 
hybridity and norm complexity by analyzing the parallel normative evolution of military and 
judicial intervention practices. It seeks to explain why the relationship between both forms of 
intervention has been contested and how they have nevertheless become positively associated as 
part of the liberal interventionist toolkit. As highlighted by previous studies, each of the two 
practices can be traced back to discursive and institutional shifts that merged human rights 
norms—in different ways—with older norms on the use of force. These mergers, it is argued 
below, can be interpreted as processes of norm hybridization that rearranged old and new 
normative ideas in specific, complex ways. These complexities, in turn, create opportunities for 
linking both forms of intervention in different (positive and negative) ways, enabling 
controversies over their relationship, but also attempts to forge new, hybrid compromise 
arrangements under the shared roof of liberal interventionism. 
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III. THE HYBRID ORIGINS OF MILITARY AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
PRACTICES 
The Rwandan genocide and the Balkan wars of the 1990s were the trigger events which paved 
the way for two distinct modes of post-Cold War liberal interventionism: humanitarian military 
interventions, as exemplified by NATO’s operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and international 
criminal prosecutions of human rights violators, first in the International Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and then, from 2003 onwards, in the permanent ICC. Both 
intervention practices were grounded in a normative shift toward conditioning sovereignty on 
respect for human rights, which activists had advocated since the 1970s.
23
 And yet, each practice 
also has distinct, older historical roots and is reflective of a specific mix of human rights norms 
with pre-existing normative ideas about the initiation and conduct of war. The following section 
summarizes existing analyses of these historical mergers, arguing that they constitute instances 
of norm hybridization. 
The term “humanitarian intervention” was coined in the nineteenth century by 
international lawyers, though the idea has a much longer history. Notions of “just war” that can 
be traced back to antiquity were infused with humanitarian ideals by renaissance and 
enlightenment thinkers.
24
 By the twentieth century, the protection of universal human rights 
victim had become the dominant justification for just wars, deviating from the – by then widely 
accepted – norm of non-intervention.25 Yet, only the latter was formalized in the UN Charter, 
whereas “humanitarian intervention” never crossed the threshold of an informal and highly 
contested moral norm.
26
 
Judicial interventions through international tribunals are equally rooted in a—different 
and more complex—amalgamation of human rights norms with older notions of just war. While 
 8 
the concept of humanitarian intervention emerged from a confluence of human rights norms with 
pre-existing normative ideas about just causes for war (jus ad bellum), international criminal 
justice was born from a merger of human rights norms with the second component of the just 
war doctrine, normative ideas about the just conduct of war (jus in bello), or international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Prior to this merger, IHL had been understood as an inter-state contract 
that could be enforced through the “collective sanctions of classical international law: belligerent 
reprisals durante bello and war reparations post bellum."
27
 From the late nineteenth century 
onwards, the notion of individual human rights began to delegitimize such collective sanctions in 
the eyes of humanitarian activists and international lawyers.
28
 Individual criminal accountability 
came to be advocated as a more humane mode of IHL enforcement 
29
 and was eventually 
institutionalized by the victorious Allies of World War II in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals. 
While the emerging international criminal justice system thus contributed to the 
“humanization” of IHL,30 it also took up existing ideas about the jus ad bellum, yet in a 
fundamentally different way than the informal humanitarian intervention norm. While the latter 
was formed to justify deviations from the non-intervention principle, the Nuremberg Tribunal 
positively affirmed the same principle by criminalizing aggression as the “supreme international 
crime."
31
 While the tribunal also helped to “legitimate Allied intervention in the war,"32 this was 
based on an understanding that defense against aggression had constituted the cause of the 
intervention. 
Of course, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals did not immediately lead to the 
institutionalization of a permanent international criminal justice system. As Kathryn Sikkink 
argues, the emergence of international tribunals was only one of two historical “streams” that 
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eventually produced such a permanent system in the late 1990s.
 33
 The second “stream” – which 
reflected the further spread of human rights norms and was unrelated to the ideas about just war 
that influenced the first stream – emerged in the 1970sand 1980s, when newly democratized 
European and Latin American countries began to prosecute their former authoritarian leaders in 
domestic courts for human rights violations committed during their reign. This move toward 
transitional justice was contested, as many feared that trials could provoke backlashes against 
new democratic governments. In part to overcome these political objections to domestic 
prosecutions, their advocates turned to the international community for support. The persistence 
of a “culture of impunity” in many transitional states became perhaps the most important 
argument for advocates of a permanent ICC in the 1990s.
34
 In 1998, thus, the domestic and 
international streams flowed together in the establishment of the ICC,
35
 which has since become 
the primary instrument of international judicial intervention. 
Humanitarian military interventions and judicial interventions, in short, have their roots 
in historical processes that combined human rights norms—in different ways—with earlier 
normative ideas about war and warfare into new normative arrangements. While each of these 
historical trajectories has been reconstructed in previous studies, IR scholars interested in norm 
dynamics have failed to take note of them as prominent cases of norm hybridization. 
Furthermore, neither legal nor IR scholars have investigated how their partially shared, hybrid 
normative origins and resulting internal complexities have shaped the relationship between both 
modes of intervention. 
The following section addresses this gap. To capture the evolving relationship between 
military and judicial intervention practices, it analyses public discursive justifications given by 
key political actors—including state governments, international organizations, and non-state 
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activists—for both modes of intervention at different historical moments since 1945. This 
methodological choice rests on two assumptions which are widely shared among IR scholars 
interested in the study of norms and discourse in world politics. The first assumption holds that 
norms, as intersubjective standards of behavior, evolve through discursive arguments.
36
 The 
second assumption holds that although public discourses should not be treated as revealing 
actors’ true motives for engaging in certain practices, they legitimize and enable collective 
decisions.
37
 For reasons of space, the analysis zooms in on discursive shifts that took place after 
the turn of the millennium, analyzing earlier developments more selectively. 
IV. LINKING JUDICIAL AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
When the debate about humanitarian intervention was revived and the international criminal 
justice system took shape in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was far from clear to 
contemporaries how these developments would influence one another. As discussed in the 
introduction to this article, many warned—or hoped—that a permanent ICC would curb Western 
enthusiasm for military intervention. Some voices, however, also predicted a close association 
between judicial and military intervention,
38
 and it is these predictions that appear to have 
materialized twenty years on. Military and judicial interventions have gone hand in hand in many 
recent cases, and recent analyses argue that the ICC has been instrumentalized to legitimize 
military interventions
39
 or “follows the flag” of Western interventions.40 
Processes of norm hybridization can explain both the initial uncertainty over the 
relationship between military and judicial interventions and the evolution toward a positive 
association. As analyzed below, the hybrid normative roots of military and judicial intervention 
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practices and their resulting internal complexities gave room to both positive and negative 
interpretations of their mutual relationship. The fact that both have nevertheless become 
positively associated as complementary tools of liberal interventionism can only be understood 
by taking into account political efforts to craft new discursive—and to some extent legal—
normative compromise arrangements. Specifically, the integration of both intervention practices 
had to overcome three difficulties: a lack of clarity about the respective goals of judicial and 
military interventions, a mismatch of scope, and the potential for a direct collision between 
military intervention and the anti-aggression norm of international criminal law. 
A. Realigning the Goals of Judicial and Military Interventions 
The first hurdle to integrating military and judicial interventions under the roof of liberal 
interventionism was a lack of clarity about precisely how their respective goals relate to one 
another, and whether, consequently, any division of labor between both is conceivable. 
1. Ambivalent Intervention Rationales 
While humanitarian intervention has the straightforward goal of ending ongoing human rights 
violations, the goals of international criminal justice are more varied and ambiguous, owing in 
part to the different historical sources and resulting complexity of modern international criminal 
law. 
The question of “why punish” has occupied philosophers for centuries, and continues to 
be debated in domestic as well as international criminal law.
41
 Classical punishment rationales 
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include retribution, the goal of righting past wrongs, and deterrence, the goal of discouraging 
other would-be perpetrators. More recently, legal theorists have emphasized expressivism—the 
goal of affirming a community’s values—and restorative justice, which includes the goals of 
compensating victims and fostering societal reconciliation. 
Among these punishment rationales, legal deterrence is most closely related to the goal of 
humanitarian military intervention. And while the deterrence argument played a role in each of 
the historical streams that became hybridized in modern international criminal law, there was a 
considerable variation across those streams in arguments about what deterrence meant and how it 
would work—suggesting different possible connections to military measures. 
For the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, deterrence was still 
secondary to retributive justifications.
42
 It was also described as a long-term strategy that 
followed a victorious military intervention 
43—an intervention that was justified not as a 
humanitarian one but as defense against aggression. However, it is often overlooked that even 
with regard to WW II crimes, discussions of deterrence were not limited to a post-conflict, post-
intervention context. Already in the final years of the war, the Allies issued repeated warnings to 
the officers of Hitler’s retreating army that they would be held accountable after the war for any 
atrocities they were about to commit. At the 1943 Moscow Conference, for instance, they 
declared: 
Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware 
lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers 
will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their 
accusors in order that justice may be done.
44
 
In the first historical stream that came to shape international criminal justice, thus, legal 
deterrence was framed as working both during and after armed conflict, as a complement to 
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military action. 
In the domestic transitional justice processes that contributed to the emergence of the 
international criminal justice system in the second historical stream, the emphasis shifted from 
retributive and deterrence-based motives—the 1980s trials in Argentina, for instance, were 
directly inspired by Carlos Nino’s “consensual theory of punishment” combining both of these 
elements—45 toward restorative justifications.46 In this context, legal deterrence was portrayed as 
a long-term endeavor working outside the context of armed conflict and without any external 
military interference. 
When these two historical streams were merged, all of the punishment rationales 
expressed in them were embraced by the post-Cold War international criminal justice system.
47
 
Yet it was the deterrence rationale that moved to the foreground of the international criminal 
justice discourse, and earlier ideas about legal deterrence were brought together. The notion that 
legal deterrence can work during an ongoing conflict—as reflected in the Allies’ statements 
during World War II—was combined with the argument—formed in later domestic transition 
processes—that legal deterrence can work without external military intervention. The result was 
a new “specific deterrence” argument voiced particularly strongly by non-governmental activists. 
According to this argument, prosecutions could be used during conflicts to end ongoing atrocities 
without external military intervention, by delegitimizing and marginalizing indicted actors.
48
 
International criminal justice thus began to be portrayed as an alternative to military intervention, 
not only by activists but also increasingly by government officials. For instance, the hope to 
avoid a costly military intervention played an important role in Western governments’ decision 
to set up the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
49
 
And yet, the argument that justice could substitute for military intervention never fully 
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replaced alternative framings of the relationship between judicial and military measures that 
continued to exist within the complex international criminal justice discourse. The Nuremberg 
model of legitimating military interventions with criminal prosecutions also continued to be 
applied—but now to interventions justified with humanitarian ends. Again, this dynamic played 
out most visibly in the Balkans, when NATO’s eventual intervention in Bosnia and, later, its 
intervention in Kosovo, drew legitimacy from the ICTY.
50
 Another alternative perspective that 
became prominent in the 1990s framed criminal justice as part of a broader liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm, echoing the emphasis of earlier domestic trials on societal reconciliation and placing 
justice in a post-conflict context.
51
 
To summarize, in the 1990s a stronger emphasis on legal deterrence produced a stronger 
convergence between the stated goals of military and judicial interventions but left open the 
question of whether judicial interventionism could serve as a substitute for—and potential 
challenge to—military interventionism, or as a complement that either legitimates the use of 
force or follows its cessation. 
2. Realigning Rationales Under Responsibility to Protect 
This ambivalence was initially maintained, and even cemented, by the integration of judicial and 
military interventions under the conceptual roof of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) which 
emerged from attempts to balance the burgeoning human rights interventionism with the norm of 
state sovereignty.
52
 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), which first elaborated the concept, sought to achieve this delicate balance with a dual 
move. First, external interventions were legitimated by conditioning sovereignty on a state’s 
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fulfillment of its protection duty toward its own citizens. Second, the particularly controversial 
practice of military intervention in reaction to protection failures
53
 was placed within a 
“continuum” of crisis responses that included a range of non-military measures, as well as pre-
and post-crisis responsibilities in addition to the “responsibility to react."54 
International criminal justice, and the ICC in particular, was key to the second of these 
discursive moves. By emphasizing the ICC’s preventive function and its contribution to post-
conflict peacebuilding, R2P advocates framed judicial interventions as part of the responsibility 
to prevent and responsibility to rebuild.
55
 This interpretation reflected the notion of a division of 
labor, with military intervention as a reactive tool of short-term crisis management and judicial 
intervention as a long-term instrument of prevention and stabilization. At the same time, 
however, the ICISS report also portrayed judicial intervention as a possible alternative to military 
action in reacting to ongoing violence: “By far the most controversial form of [. . .] intervention 
is military [. . .]. But we are also very much concerned with alternatives to military action, 
including [. . .] coercive intervention measures—sanctions and criminal prosecutions—falling 
short of military intervention.”56 
By maintaining this ambivalence about the relationship of judicial and military measures, 
the ICISS report offered something both to supporters of military humanitarian intervention that 
viewed judicial interventions as complementary and to critics that insisted on non-military 
alternatives even at the height of crisis. Over time, however, this compromise arrangement 
proved too fragile to maintain. 
In particular, the emphasis on the instrumental value of international judicial 
interventions invited counter-arguments that questioned their value on instrumental grounds.
57
 
As mentioned above, the critics of domestic human rights trials already voiced objections to 
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criminal prosecutions in the 1970s and 1980s. With international criminal justice being presented 
as an instrument in the R2P toolbox, these long-standing instrumental objections also gained 
prominence among practitioners and commentators. Often, they took the form of warnings 
against a “peace versus justice” dilemma,58 casting particularly strong doubt on the idea that 
trials could serve as instruments of short-term deterrence and crisis management. 
The possibility that the goals of peace and justice might clash at least in the short term 
was already implicitly recognized by the drafters of the ICC Statute, which gave the UN Security 
Council the authority not only to refer cases to the court, but also to defer them.
59
 While the 
Council has not yet used the latter option,
60
 the peace versus justice discourse has remained 
powerful both among UN member states and in the UN bureaucracy. For instance, Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno, the longstanding head of UN peacekeeping, criticizes the ICC intervention in Darfur 
as “dangerous” and “careless” in his memoirs.61 
States, NGOs, and international organizations sought to defend international criminal 
justice against this persistent critique. In 2007, for instance, the governments of Finland, 
Germany, and Jordan hosted an international conference that brought together academics, 
governments and NGOs and resulted in the adoption of the Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and 
Justice. The Declaration claims that “[p]eace and justice, if properly pursued, promote and 
sustain one another. The question can never be whether to pursue justice, but rather when and 
how.” (III.1) In this and other formulations, the drafters implicitly acknowledge peace versus 
justice dilemmas if both aims are not “properly pursued." Recognizing the “imperative to stop 
the fighting” (IV.1.1), as well as the need to combine prosecutions with non-retributive forms of 
transitional justice, the Declaration emphasizes the long-term benefits of justice.
62
 Thus, it steps 
back from specific deterrence claims, undermining the argument that judicial intervention could 
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serve as a substitute for military measures. 
UN reports on the R2P have moved in a similar direction. The UN Secretary General, for 
instance, argued in his 2009 report that crisis mediators could try to “dissuade [conflict parties] 
from destructive courses of action that could make them subject to prosecution by the 
International Criminal Court.”63 In this reading, it is no longer actual trials that exert a specific 
deterrent effect but the threat of a potential judicial intervention. The 2015 report mentioned the 
“prospect of prosecution by the International Criminal Court” merely in passing,64 and the 2017 
report only affirmed the ICC’s long-term contribution to the “non-recurrence” of atrocity 
crimes.
65
 Despite this gradual discursive shift, specific deterrence claims have not disappeared 
from global political debates. For instance, Western diplomats justified the UN Security 
Council’s referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC as a “move [. . .] designed to change the 
mindset of those around Gaddafi,”66 and states demanding a referral of the Syrian situation 
argued that “such a warning would have an important dissuasive effect.”67 In neither case, 
however, was legal deterrence portrayed as an effective alternative to military measures. In the 
Libyan case, the ICC referral was quickly followed by a Western military intervention to end 
atrocities. In the case of Syria, specific deterrence claims were countered by “peace versus 
justice” arguments, as exemplified by Hilary Clinton’s warning in 2012 that calling Bashar Al-
Assad a war criminal could “complicate a resolution of a difficult, complex situation."68 
In summary, the integration of judicial and military intervention measures in the R2P 
framework did not initially privilege any of the conceivable alternative interpretations of their 
relationship. Over time, this ambivalent compromise gave way to a predominant emphasis on a 
division of labor. And yet, the discursive construction of this complementary relationship could 
not succeed without overcoming two further obstacles: a mismatch of scope between norms of 
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military and judicial intervention, and the potential of a collision between military humanitarian 
intervention and the prohibition of aggression under international criminal law. 
3. Readjusting the Scope of Intervention 
The hybrid origins of military and judicial intervention practices did not only generate 
ambivalence about their respective rationales, but also a mismatch of scope: the range of human 
rights violations justifying intervention into a given crisis was defined differently in both 
normative contexts. 
With regard to military humanitarian intervention, the marriage of human rights norms 
with ideas of just war did not, per se, restrict the universe of violations warranting intervention. 
Consequently, humanitarian interventions were justified in the 1990s and 2000s with purposes 
ranging from  protecting Bosnian civilians from ethnic cleansing and genocide to enforcing 
access for humanitarian aid in Somalia to restoring Haiti’s democratic government after a 
military coup to protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan.69 
In comparison, the specific mix of human rights, jus ad bellum and jus in bello norms that 
gave rise to international criminal law produced a narrow focus on four crimes: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. While war crimes are a traditional IHL concept, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal first recognized crimes against humanity and genocide as international 
crimes that reflected a broader notion of human rights,
70
 albeit still with a nexus to armed 
conflict. The crime of aggression added twentieth century jus ad bellum to the mix. When 
international criminal law took its contemporary shape in the 1998 Rome Statute, the scope of 
relevant violations was somewhat broadened by dropping the link to armed conflict for genocide 
and crimes against humanity and by extending the category of war crimes to cover non-
international armed conflicts.
71
 These revisions reflected the legacy of the 1970s and 1980s 
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domestic trials, but the ICC Statute was still much narrower than the scope of human rights 
violations cited to legitimize military interventions. 
When the ICISS sought to integrate military and judicial intervention measures under the 
roof of the R2P, the commission thus faced the somewhat paradoxical situation that the (legally 
binding and widely recognized) normative framework of international criminal law enabled 
judicial responses to only a narrow set of abuses, whereas the (informal and politically contested) 
norm of humanitarian intervention justified military responses to a much wider set of crimes. To 
maintain both practices under a common framework, it was necessary to re-align their scope. 
The 2001 ICISS report resolved the contradiction only in part. The document still referred in 
rather vague terms to states’ “responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable 
catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation.”72 In elaborating what would 
constitute a just cause for intervention, the document further argued that 
there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or 
imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large scale loss of life, actual 
or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; 
or B. large scale "ethnic cleansing," actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
73
 
While these formulations already placed stronger emphasis than earlier justifications of military 
interventions on rights violations of a particularly high gravity, they were still open to including 
a broad array of state policies into the list of potential intervention triggers. It was not until 2005 
that UN member states, in officially endorsing the R2P concept at the World Summit, clearly 
limited its scope to the gravest violations. The state’s protection duty was now defined as a 
“responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity."
74
 The new language almost exactly mirrored the core crimes as defined under 
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the ICC Statute—with the exception of aggression, which is not a violation of individual rights.75 
The institutionalization of the R2P thus re-adjusted the scope of military humanitarian 
intervention to match the traditionally narrower scope of judicial intervention. This re-alignment, 
it should be noted, was driven less by an abstract dispute about logical contradictions between 
the R2P and international criminal law than by a political controversy over a specific 
intervention. US and British attempts to justify the 2003 Iraq war with references to R2P were 
widely perceived as an abuse of the concept, and propelled efforts to clarify the conditions for its 
applicability.
76
 And yet, the kind of clarification that was reached in 2005 did not incidentally 
echo international criminal law’s emphasis on four core crimes. The establishment of a direct 
link between international criminal justice and just causes for intervention allowed R2P 
proponents to borrow from the legitimacy of international criminal law, which was much more 
firmly established than the contested humanitarian intervention norm. As David Scheffer, former 
US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, argues: 
The identification of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity as the premise for prevention or action under R2P derives much of its 
legitimacy from the jurisprudence of the international and hybrid criminal 
tribunals built during the 1990s [. . .] and the permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC).”77 
According to Scheffer, the atrocity focus of R2P—which he advocates—does not imply that 
political leaders need to wait for an ICC judgment before launching a military R2P operation. 
Even without or before a judgment, the link facilitates the task of publicly justifying why 
military action is needed. In Scheffer’s words, “ ‘atrocity crimes’ is terminology that [. . .] 
enables timely public discourse” about “effective responses” to events.78 
Thus, the realignment of military and judicial intervention triggers not only delegitimized 
the most controversial military responses to rights violations, it also helped intervention 
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proponents—in all the other cases that clearly fall within the scope of the core crimes—to tap 
into international criminal justice as a resource for legitimating, rather than replacing, military 
responses to mass atrocities. 
In 2011, the Western intervention in Libya demonstrated this legitimizing effect in 
practice. For instance, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen commented on the 
issuing of the ICC arrest warrants against Al-Gaddafi and other regime figures by claiming: 
“This decision once again highlights the increasing isolation of the Gaddafi regime. It reinforces 
the reason for NATO’s mission to protect the Libyan people from Gaddafi’s forces.”79 
3. Averting a norm collision 
If the readjustment of scope allowed proponents of military humanitarian intervention to draw on 
international criminal justice as a source of legitimacy, this legitimizing power could only be 
harnessed in full if a further obstacle could be overcome: the potential for humanitarian military 
interventions to collide with international criminal law’s prohibition of aggression. The source of 
this potential collision, once more, lies in the hybrid normative origins of both practices. As 
discussed above, the practices of humanitarian military intervention and judicial intervention 
drew in radically different ways on pre-existing jus ad bellum norms: the humanitarian 
intervention concept legitimized deviations from the nascent norm of non-intervention, whereas 
international criminal justice embraced and consolidated it in the prohibition of aggression. 
In the post-World War II setting, this normative tension between both forms of 
intervention did not yet materialize into a real political problem. Since the Allied war effort was 
justified not in humanitarian terms but as defense against aggression, the Nuremberg prohibition 
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of aggression even helped to legitimize Allied intervention against the Axis powers. Political 
circumstances had changed dramatically, however, when the ICC Statute was negotiated half a 
century later. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were not directed against states that 
had engaged in aggressive behavior toward the outside world. It was therefore clear to 
negotiators that including the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute could—depending on its 
definition—create a new legal tool for challenging and deterring humanitarian military 
interventions, particularly those conducted without Security Council authorization. This concern 
was voiced most strongly by US policymakers before and during the Rome negotiations and 
contributed to American hostility toward the new court.
80
 In 1995, for instance, a US legal 
adviser warned in a UN General Assembly debate about the establishment of a permanent ICC: 
The Nuremburg Tribunal did not have to confront this problem, as it was dealing, 
after the fact, with a clear and specific case. In the abstract, however, it is not at 
all universally established what fits even within the limited concept of ‘waging a 
war of aggression.’ What are the possible defenses or mitigating factors in 
connection with such a charge? [. . .] What about controversial concepts such as 
humanitarian intervention or a war of liberation?
81
 
At the same time, the possibility that the future ICC could deter military humanitarian 
interventions by prosecuting aggression was a reason why so many states from the Global South 
were strongly in favor of including the crime in the Rome Statute.
82
 In 1998, negotiators agreed 
on a compromise that included aggression in Article 5 of the ICC Statute, but stipulated that the 
court could not exercise jurisdiction over it until a consensus definition had been agreed. 
In the negotiations leading up to the 2010 ICC Review Conference in Kampala, the 
unresolved question of humanitarian intervention thus loomed large.
83
 The idea of explicitly 
exempting humanitarian uses of force from the definition of aggression was advocated most 
vocally by the United States, which—despite its non-membership of the court—became involved 
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in the late stages of the Kampala preparation process as an observer state. By this time, however, 
a Special Working Group had already agreed on a consensus formulation defining the crime of 
aggression as an “act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”84 When US negotiators raised 
objections to this formulation, other states were unwilling to reopen negotiations on the agreed 
compromise. 
Instead, US concerns were dealt with as part of a separate negotiation process at Kampala 
that sought to clarify the meaning of manifest violations in a series of understandings to be 
adopted by ICC states parties in addition to the formal statute amendments.
85
 Even in this 
negotiation track, US negotiators failed to gain sufficient support for a formulation which stated 
that “an act undertaken in connection with an effort to prevent the commission of any of the 
crimes contained in Articles 6 [genocide], 7 [crimes against humanity] or 8 [war crimes] of the 
Statute would not constitute an act of aggression.”86 
However, it is worth noting that the eventually agreed formula for determining whether 
an act of aggression has been committed which “requires consideration of all the circumstances 
of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (Understanding 6) was interpreted by 
observers as opening the door to a differentiation between humanitarian and other uses of force 
violating the UN Charter.
87
 
In addition, the rules adopted at Kampala on the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
aggression also made it less likely that the court will prosecute uses of force such as the 
contested Kosovo intervention. If ICC jurisdiction is triggered by a state referral or undertaken 
on the Prosecutor’s own initiative, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of ICC 
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non-members; ICC states parties, on the other hand, can protect their nationals with an “opt-
out.”88 Negotiators also agreed at Kampala to defer the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
aggression for another seven years, requiring two thirds of ICC members to adopt an activating 
decision in 2017. 
The discussion about aggression was thus not over after Kampala. The United States in 
particular continued to worry that ICC jurisdiction over aggression would obstruct legitimate 
uses of force, including for humanitarian purposes. As US legal advisers explained: 
[T]here is a concomitant risk that a broad or vague definition will [. . .] 
discourag[e] states from using force in cases where they should. [. . .] Ironically, 
one such result could be that the ICC ends up prolonging violence and abuses of 
human rights by deterring future military actions—for example, ones parallel to 
the intervention frequently urged in Rwanda in 1994—aimed at stopping the 
commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, which the 
Rome Statute sought to eliminate.
89
 
While the authors argue that the exclusion of humanitarian interventions is implicit in 
Understanding 6, they contend that “the Kampala conference’s reluctance to address explicitly 
such an important concern leaves the issue with an unfortunate ambiguity that may make it 
harder to prevent atrocity crimes in the future.”90 
The United States was not the only state that remained skeptical of the Kampala 
compromise. France and the United Kingdom sought to reinforce protections for ICC member 
states by insisting that the ICC could only exercise jurisdiction for aggression over the nationals 
of those member states that had ratified the aggression amendment—effectively an opt-in rather 
than an opt-out regime. Despite widespread opposition to this interpretation, the majority of 
member states eventually accepted the minority view so as to enable a consensual activating 
decision at the ICC’s 2017 Assembly of States Parties.91 
Thus, when the ASP decision entered into force on 17 July 2018, the ICC’s jurisdiction 
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over aggression had been restricted substantively and procedurally by including multiple 
protections for states (both ICC members and non-members) potentially involved in military 
humanitarian interventions. In the eyes of one analyst, this outcome was “quite ironic because it 
means that the 4 states that had conducted the Nuremberg prosecutions are either now caved out 
of crime of aggression jurisdiction (the US and Russia as non-States Parties) or can easily do so 
by not ratifying the amendment (the UK and France).”92 In light of the above analysis, however, 
the “ironic” outcome appears as a coherent part of a larger process through which historically 
rooted tensions between military and judicial interventions were overcome by forging normative 
compromises. The aggression compromise enabled a complementary understanding of military 
and judicial interventions—as it had already prevailed at the time of the Nuremberg tribunal—to 
live on under the changed geopolitical circumstances of the post-Cold War world.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The rise of liberal human rights norms, it has often been argued, has led to a liberal 
interventionism in the name of individual human rights in the post-Cold War era. This article 
unpacks this rights-based interventionism, scrutinizing the specific historical trajectories of 
(some of) its individual components and the evolution of their interrelationship. Focusing 
specifically on humanitarian military interventions and judicial interventions through 
international criminal tribunals, the preceding analysis highlights how each of these practices 
emerged from a hybridization of human rights norms with pre-existing norms of warfare, and 
how these hybrid origins created room for ambiguity and controversy concerning their mutual 
relationship. The fact that both practices of intervention have come to be interpreted as 
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complementary tools of liberal interventionism, it is argued, must be understood as the outcome 
of discursive and institutional compromises that were forged to overcome normative tensions. In 
particular, the rationales of military and judicial interventions were gradually re-interpreted to 
allow for an integration of both measures as complementary (rather than alternative) tools of the 
responsibility to protect; the scope of the responsibility to protect was narrowed to mirror the 
focus of international criminal law on four core crimes; and potential legal challenges to 
humanitarian intervention were overcome by limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression 
through definitional and jurisdictional safeguards. 
In highlighting the historical origins of norm complexity and strategies for dealing with 
it, the article makes the broader theoretical point that processes of hybridization between 
different global norms constitute both sources and products of norm dynamism. The historical 
trajectories of military and judicial intervention practices and their underlying norms exemplify a 
cyclical move: different normative elements are hybridized into new global norms, whose 
resulting internal complexity opens up room for contestation over their relationship with other 
global norms, leading political actors to forge new compromise arrangements. This dynamic also 
suggests that present consensus about the relationship between judicial and military interventions 
should not be viewed as an end state of the debate. As the preceding analysis demonstrates, 
hybrid norms always remain fragile and open to challenges by political actors that can draw on 
their various elements to creatively rearrange them in new situations. 
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